1 00:00:00,783 --> 00:00:01,683 Welcome to Log 2 00:00:01,683 --> 00:00:02,766 Level Debug, a 3 00:00:02,766 --> 00:00:03,566 technology news 4 00:00:03,566 --> 00:00:04,566 show that's being 5 00:00:04,566 --> 00:00:05,316 recorded from a 6 00:00:05,316 --> 00:00:05,700 different 7 00:00:05,700 --> 00:00:06,566 room than usual, 8 00:00:06,983 --> 00:00:07,650 but you can't 9 00:00:07,650 --> 00:00:08,466 tell because of 10 00:00:08,466 --> 00:00:09,183 the green screen. 11 00:00:10,116 --> 00:00:11,016 And I'm the host, 12 00:00:11,400 --> 00:00:12,083 because I was too 13 00:00:12,083 --> 00:00:12,516 slow to 14 00:00:12,516 --> 00:00:13,266 say not it. 15 00:00:13,866 --> 00:00:14,433 Now let's talk 16 00:00:14,433 --> 00:00:15,333 tech news. 17 00:00:16,616 --> 00:00:17,166 Good news 18 00:00:17,166 --> 00:00:18,366 everyone, we were 19 00:00:18,449 --> 00:00:19,949 very light on AI 20 00:00:19,949 --> 00:00:20,883 stories this last 21 00:00:20,883 --> 00:00:22,316 week, but 22 00:00:22,316 --> 00:00:22,916 the bad news 23 00:00:22,916 --> 00:00:23,433 is it was 24 00:00:23,433 --> 00:00:24,333 replaced with a 25 00:00:24,333 --> 00:00:26,283 ton of news about 26 00:00:26,283 --> 00:00:26,666 software 27 00:00:26,666 --> 00:00:27,566 vulnerabilities. 28 00:00:28,316 --> 00:00:28,800 Zero-day 29 00:00:28,800 --> 00:00:29,516 vulnerabilities 30 00:00:29,516 --> 00:00:30,533 have risen like 31 00:00:30,533 --> 00:00:31,083 the price of 32 00:00:31,083 --> 00:00:31,883 pancakes. 33 00:00:33,899 --> 00:00:34,649 Pancakes are 34 00:00:34,683 --> 00:00:35,483 expensive these 35 00:00:35,483 --> 00:00:36,083 days, right? 36 00:00:36,566 --> 00:00:37,233 When I go out for 37 00:00:37,233 --> 00:00:38,066 brunch my bill is 38 00:00:38,066 --> 00:00:39,683 like $200, and 39 00:00:39,683 --> 00:00:40,766 all I get is a 40 00:00:40,833 --> 00:00:41,250 stack of 41 00:00:41,250 --> 00:00:43,049 pancakes and an 42 00:00:43,116 --> 00:00:43,983 unknown number of 43 00:00:43,983 --> 00:00:45,000 mimosa pitchers. 44 00:00:45,716 --> 00:00:46,049 I've always 45 00:00:46,049 --> 00:00:46,733 assumed that two 46 00:00:46,733 --> 00:00:47,399 pancakes are the 47 00:00:47,399 --> 00:00:48,149 expensive part, 48 00:00:48,149 --> 00:00:49,316 but by the time 49 00:00:49,316 --> 00:00:50,016 I'm paying 50 00:00:50,166 --> 00:00:50,399 the 51 00:00:50,466 --> 00:00:51,333 receipt is fuzzy. 52 00:00:52,133 --> 00:00:53,033 Anyway, this 53 00:00:53,033 --> 00:00:53,850 chart comes 54 00:00:53,850 --> 00:00:55,316 from... well I 55 00:00:55,316 --> 00:00:56,100 forget, but we'll 56 00:00:56,100 --> 00:00:56,549 put a link 57 00:00:56,549 --> 00:00:57,116 on the screen. 58 00:00:57,266 --> 00:00:59,616 Um... right here. 59 00:01:00,683 --> 00:01:01,433 As you can see, 60 00:01:01,466 --> 00:01:02,366 there's a slight 61 00:01:02,399 --> 00:01:03,033 uptick of 62 00:01:03,033 --> 00:01:04,833 CVEs in 2023. 63 00:01:05,633 --> 00:01:06,299 I don't know why. 64 00:01:06,966 --> 00:01:07,316 And there's a 65 00:01:07,316 --> 00:01:07,799 huge 66 00:01:07,799 --> 00:01:09,333 uptick in 2026. 67 00:01:10,049 --> 00:01:11,133 There are so many 68 00:01:11,133 --> 00:01:11,966 CVEs being 69 00:01:11,966 --> 00:01:13,233 discovered that 70 00:01:13,266 --> 00:01:14,516 this past April 71 00:01:14,549 --> 00:01:15,750 NIST changed how 72 00:01:15,750 --> 00:01:16,416 they detail 73 00:01:16,566 --> 00:01:17,283 CVEs. 74 00:01:17,833 --> 00:01:18,466 They used to add 75 00:01:18,466 --> 00:01:19,616 details to each 76 00:01:19,633 --> 00:01:20,533 and every one. 77 00:01:21,200 --> 00:01:22,016 Their update 78 00:01:22,166 --> 00:01:22,516 means that 79 00:01:22,516 --> 00:01:23,233 they'll only add 80 00:01:23,233 --> 00:01:23,933 details to the 81 00:01:23,933 --> 00:01:24,583 important ones. 82 00:01:25,316 --> 00:01:26,866 But now so many 83 00:01:26,933 --> 00:01:28,516 important CVEs 84 00:01:29,000 --> 00:01:29,566 are dropping 85 00:01:29,566 --> 00:01:30,733 every week that 86 00:01:30,733 --> 00:01:31,483 we have to assume 87 00:01:31,483 --> 00:01:32,033 the process 88 00:01:32,033 --> 00:01:32,750 will change 89 00:01:32,833 --> 00:01:33,566 yet again. 90 00:01:34,216 --> 00:01:34,633 I'm sure they'll 91 00:01:34,633 --> 00:01:35,233 announce a new 92 00:01:35,233 --> 00:01:35,966 process in a 93 00:01:35,966 --> 00:01:37,133 month, just 94 00:01:37,133 --> 00:01:38,066 leaving a web 95 00:01:38,066 --> 00:01:38,816 form open on the 96 00:01:38,816 --> 00:01:40,099 internet and say 97 00:01:40,433 --> 00:01:40,933 "go to town 98 00:01:40,933 --> 00:01:41,383 everybody." 99 00:01:42,466 --> 00:01:43,433 For everyone, the 100 00:01:43,433 --> 00:01:44,000 recommended 101 00:01:44,000 --> 00:01:45,133 practice is still 102 00:01:45,316 --> 00:01:46,033 patch early 103 00:01:46,033 --> 00:01:46,583 and often. 104 00:01:47,266 --> 00:01:47,783 Unless it's a 105 00:01:47,783 --> 00:01:48,616 malicious patch 106 00:01:48,616 --> 00:01:49,250 created by an 107 00:01:49,250 --> 00:01:49,849 unauthorized 108 00:01:49,849 --> 00:01:50,983 user, in that 109 00:01:50,983 --> 00:01:52,616 case, don't patch 110 00:01:52,633 --> 00:01:53,933 early or often. 111 00:01:54,833 --> 00:01:55,483 And if you're not 112 00:01:55,483 --> 00:01:57,200 sure, rule a d20. 113 00:01:57,716 --> 00:01:59,533 On a 2-20 patch. 114 00:01:59,866 --> 00:02:01,183 On a 1, you're 115 00:02:01,183 --> 00:02:02,150 too busy dealing 116 00:02:02,150 --> 00:02:02,833 with a critical 117 00:02:02,833 --> 00:02:03,349 failure to 118 00:02:03,349 --> 00:02:04,099 patch anyway. 119 00:02:04,916 --> 00:02:05,266 I hope that 120 00:02:05,266 --> 00:02:05,866 clears things up. 121 00:02:10,516 --> 00:02:11,449 Amazon is 122 00:02:11,449 --> 00:02:12,383 spending $3 123 00:02:12,383 --> 00:02:13,783 billion a month 124 00:02:13,783 --> 00:02:14,983 buying GPUs for 125 00:02:14,983 --> 00:02:16,516 AI and not even 126 00:02:16,516 --> 00:02:17,000 using them. 127 00:02:17,816 --> 00:02:17,933 They're 128 00:02:17,933 --> 00:02:19,016 purchasing stock 129 00:02:19,016 --> 00:02:19,916 of GPUs while 130 00:02:19,916 --> 00:02:21,166 they can without 131 00:02:21,166 --> 00:02:22,099 having any other 132 00:02:22,099 --> 00:02:23,000 resources to 133 00:02:23,000 --> 00:02:23,566 be able to 134 00:02:23,566 --> 00:02:24,083 use them. 135 00:02:24,833 --> 00:02:26,233 Like power, or in 136 00:02:26,233 --> 00:02:27,283 some cases the 137 00:02:27,283 --> 00:02:27,983 data center 138 00:02:27,983 --> 00:02:28,916 building itself. 139 00:02:29,666 --> 00:02:30,199 An Amazon 140 00:02:30,199 --> 00:02:30,949 spokesperson 141 00:02:30,949 --> 00:02:31,699 called this a 142 00:02:31,733 --> 00:02:32,783 "best practice." 143 00:02:33,349 --> 00:02:34,099 But I disagree. 144 00:02:34,400 --> 00:02:35,066 If I opened my 145 00:02:35,066 --> 00:02:36,016 closet and showed 146 00:02:36,016 --> 00:02:36,383 you all the 147 00:02:36,383 --> 00:02:37,366 clutter, not a 148 00:02:37,366 --> 00:02:38,083 single person 149 00:02:38,083 --> 00:02:38,566 would use the 150 00:02:38,566 --> 00:02:39,133 phrase "best 151 00:02:39,133 --> 00:02:39,683 practice" to 152 00:02:39,683 --> 00:02:40,316 describe it. 153 00:02:40,883 --> 00:02:42,833 Some would say "I 154 00:02:42,833 --> 00:02:43,316 thought this is 155 00:02:43,316 --> 00:02:43,933 where the smell 156 00:02:43,933 --> 00:02:44,183 would be 157 00:02:44,183 --> 00:02:44,750 coming from." 158 00:02:45,566 --> 00:02:46,183 And others would 159 00:02:46,183 --> 00:02:47,566 say "Dear God, is 160 00:02:47,833 --> 00:02:48,566 that a troll?" 161 00:02:52,550 --> 00:02:53,150 You probably 162 00:02:53,150 --> 00:02:53,933 didn't hear about 163 00:02:53,933 --> 00:02:54,833 it this week, but 164 00:02:54,833 --> 00:02:55,433 there were some 165 00:02:55,766 --> 00:02:55,916 PHP 166 00:02:55,933 --> 00:02:56,716 vulnerabilities 167 00:02:56,716 --> 00:02:57,266 announced, 168 00:02:57,416 --> 00:02:57,883 dubbed 169 00:02:57,883 --> 00:02:59,633 "PHP2 Shell." 170 00:03:00,533 --> 00:03:00,866 The two 171 00:03:00,866 --> 00:03:01,766 vulnerabilities 172 00:03:01,783 --> 00:03:02,666 allow attackers 173 00:03:02,666 --> 00:03:03,416 to perform a 174 00:03:03,416 --> 00:03:04,366 remote code 175 00:03:04,366 --> 00:03:05,066 execution 176 00:03:05,066 --> 00:03:05,750 attack on 177 00:03:05,750 --> 00:03:06,566 the host machine. 178 00:03:07,316 --> 00:03:07,583 If you're 179 00:03:07,616 --> 00:03:08,383 unfamiliar with 180 00:03:08,383 --> 00:03:09,233 what that means, 181 00:03:09,566 --> 00:03:10,400 that's the worst 182 00:03:10,400 --> 00:03:10,783 type of 183 00:03:10,783 --> 00:03:11,483 vulnerability. 184 00:03:12,050 --> 00:03:12,800 It lets someone 185 00:03:12,800 --> 00:03:13,216 run their 186 00:03:13,250 --> 00:03:14,033 own code. 187 00:03:14,483 --> 00:03:15,166 Like adding that 188 00:03:15,166 --> 00:03:15,733 server to a 189 00:03:15,733 --> 00:03:16,316 botnet, 190 00:03:16,400 --> 00:03:16,966 installing a 191 00:03:16,966 --> 00:03:17,633 crypto mining 192 00:03:17,633 --> 00:03:19,033 app, or worse, 193 00:03:19,283 --> 00:03:19,916 set up their 194 00:03:19,916 --> 00:03:20,066 own 195 00:03:20,066 --> 00:03:20,966 Minecraft server. 196 00:03:22,516 --> 00:03:23,216 PHP isn't as 197 00:03:23,216 --> 00:03:24,050 popular today as 198 00:03:24,050 --> 00:03:24,466 it was in the 199 00:03:24,466 --> 00:03:25,583 past, and no one 200 00:03:25,583 --> 00:03:26,599 knows exactly how 201 00:03:26,599 --> 00:03:27,166 many sites 202 00:03:27,166 --> 00:03:27,383 on the 203 00:03:27,383 --> 00:03:28,216 internet use it. 204 00:03:28,916 --> 00:03:29,683 But estimates put 205 00:03:29,683 --> 00:03:30,050 that at 206 00:03:30,050 --> 00:03:30,816 around 70%. 207 00:03:32,066 --> 00:03:32,966 Meaning a problem 208 00:03:32,966 --> 00:03:34,433 with PHP is a 209 00:03:34,433 --> 00:03:34,916 problem for 210 00:03:34,916 --> 00:03:35,449 everyone. 211 00:03:36,283 --> 00:03:37,283 Except cats. 212 00:03:38,150 --> 00:03:39,050 Lucky bastards. 213 00:03:40,366 --> 00:03:41,066 Patches went out 214 00:03:41,066 --> 00:03:42,083 this week so you 215 00:03:42,083 --> 00:03:42,733 can patch if 216 00:03:42,733 --> 00:03:42,866 you're 217 00:03:42,866 --> 00:03:43,550 responsible for 218 00:03:43,550 --> 00:03:44,666 any PHP systems. 219 00:03:45,133 --> 00:03:45,766 And for everyone 220 00:03:45,766 --> 00:03:47,116 else, just sit 221 00:03:47,116 --> 00:03:49,033 back, relax, and 222 00:03:49,033 --> 00:03:49,616 listen to the 223 00:03:49,616 --> 00:03:50,716 screams of admins 224 00:03:50,716 --> 00:03:51,199 patching 225 00:03:51,266 --> 00:03:51,683 off in the 226 00:03:51,683 --> 00:03:52,216 distance. 227 00:03:55,883 --> 00:03:56,833 Microsoft is 228 00:03:56,833 --> 00:03:57,500 shutting down 229 00:03:57,500 --> 00:03:58,099 their "The 230 00:03:58,133 --> 00:03:59,183 Garage" program. 231 00:03:59,716 --> 00:04:00,466 Satya needs a 232 00:04:00,466 --> 00:04:00,716 better 233 00:04:00,716 --> 00:04:01,466 place to park. 234 00:04:01,916 --> 00:04:02,599 His current spot 235 00:04:02,599 --> 00:04:03,199 is right under 236 00:04:03,199 --> 00:04:04,033 some birds who 237 00:04:04,133 --> 00:04:04,783 use his car as 238 00:04:04,783 --> 00:04:05,533 target practice. 239 00:04:06,566 --> 00:04:07,433 Like an incubator 240 00:04:07,433 --> 00:04:08,233 program, "The 241 00:04:08,233 --> 00:04:09,083 Garage" was an 242 00:04:09,083 --> 00:04:09,533 internal 243 00:04:09,533 --> 00:04:10,366 makerspace that 244 00:04:10,366 --> 00:04:10,916 Microsoft 245 00:04:10,916 --> 00:04:11,516 employees could 246 00:04:11,516 --> 00:04:12,566 use in their 247 00:04:12,566 --> 00:04:13,516 off-time to work 248 00:04:13,516 --> 00:04:14,366 on fun side 249 00:04:14,366 --> 00:04:15,166 projects using 250 00:04:15,166 --> 00:04:16,016 Microsoft-funded 251 00:04:16,016 --> 00:04:16,433 equipment. 252 00:04:17,216 --> 00:04:18,233 Notable products 253 00:04:18,233 --> 00:04:18,716 that came from 254 00:04:18,716 --> 00:04:19,283 the program 255 00:04:19,316 --> 00:04:20,083 include the app 256 00:04:20,149 --> 00:04:20,866 "Mouse Without 257 00:04:20,866 --> 00:04:21,350 Borders" 258 00:04:21,766 --> 00:04:22,583 and the Xbox 259 00:04:22,583 --> 00:04:23,116 Adaptive 260 00:04:23,116 --> 00:04:23,750 Controller. 261 00:04:24,233 --> 00:04:25,616 So nothing you've 262 00:04:25,616 --> 00:04:26,666 used but have 263 00:04:26,666 --> 00:04:27,500 said you want to 264 00:04:27,500 --> 00:04:27,949 try out. 265 00:04:29,149 --> 00:04:29,966 Microsoft says 266 00:04:29,966 --> 00:04:30,733 the spirit of 267 00:04:30,733 --> 00:04:31,399 "The Garage" 268 00:04:31,433 --> 00:04:32,449 lives on in each 269 00:04:32,483 --> 00:04:33,316 and every team. 270 00:04:34,033 --> 00:04:34,733 It's allowed by a 271 00:04:34,733 --> 00:04:35,333 release form 272 00:04:35,333 --> 00:04:35,533 every 273 00:04:35,533 --> 00:04:36,283 employee signs. 274 00:04:40,283 --> 00:04:41,149 After details 275 00:04:41,149 --> 00:04:41,983 about the PHP 276 00:04:42,016 --> 00:04:42,800 vulnerabilities 277 00:04:42,800 --> 00:04:43,399 were released 278 00:04:43,399 --> 00:04:44,533 this week, the 279 00:04:44,566 --> 00:04:45,350 only guidance 280 00:04:45,350 --> 00:04:46,483 was to patch your 281 00:04:46,483 --> 00:04:47,083 systems. 282 00:04:47,366 --> 00:04:48,116 And if you can't 283 00:04:48,133 --> 00:04:49,250 do that, take 284 00:04:49,250 --> 00:04:49,816 them down. 285 00:04:50,449 --> 00:04:51,083 And if you can't 286 00:04:51,116 --> 00:04:53,233 do that, pray to 287 00:04:53,300 --> 00:04:54,283 every god you 288 00:04:54,283 --> 00:04:55,100 don't worship. 289 00:04:55,699 --> 00:04:56,366 And if things 290 00:04:56,366 --> 00:04:57,316 work out, maybe 291 00:04:57,316 --> 00:04:57,583 it's time 292 00:04:57,583 --> 00:04:58,016 to switch. 293 00:04:58,916 --> 00:04:59,683 Because of this, 294 00:04:59,683 --> 00:05:00,433 many government 295 00:05:00,433 --> 00:05:01,016 websites were 296 00:05:01,016 --> 00:05:02,033 brought down and 297 00:05:02,033 --> 00:05:02,750 stayed down 298 00:05:02,783 --> 00:05:03,283 even after 299 00:05:03,283 --> 00:05:03,766 a patch was 300 00:05:03,766 --> 00:05:05,149 available because 301 00:05:05,149 --> 00:05:05,966 of how slow 302 00:05:05,966 --> 00:05:06,383 government 303 00:05:06,383 --> 00:05:06,883 bureaucracy 304 00:05:06,883 --> 00:05:07,433 works. 305 00:05:07,966 --> 00:05:08,416 Finland, 306 00:05:08,416 --> 00:05:09,233 The Netherlands, and 307 00:05:09,266 --> 00:05:09,983 other countries 308 00:05:09,983 --> 00:05:10,633 took websites 309 00:05:10,633 --> 00:05:11,816 offline which 310 00:05:11,816 --> 00:05:12,350 brought down 311 00:05:12,350 --> 00:05:12,733 government 312 00:05:12,733 --> 00:05:13,366 services. 313 00:05:14,000 --> 00:05:14,683 Other countries 314 00:05:14,683 --> 00:05:15,350 like Japan and 315 00:05:15,350 --> 00:05:16,550 the U.S. urged 316 00:05:16,550 --> 00:05:17,300 sites to go 317 00:05:17,383 --> 00:05:18,583 offline if they 318 00:05:18,616 --> 00:05:19,466 are using PHP. 319 00:05:20,416 --> 00:05:21,050 And I'm glad it 320 00:05:21,050 --> 00:05:21,583 was only a 321 00:05:21,583 --> 00:05:22,366 recommendation. 322 00:05:22,399 --> 00:05:23,216 As an American, 323 00:05:23,233 --> 00:05:23,966 you can't force 324 00:05:23,966 --> 00:05:24,949 me to take down 325 00:05:24,949 --> 00:05:25,966 the PHP sites I 326 00:05:25,966 --> 00:05:26,633 still run. 327 00:05:26,866 --> 00:05:27,383 Just like... 328 00:05:28,433 --> 00:05:28,883 Oh that... 329 00:05:29,583 --> 00:05:29,866 Oh it just 330 00:05:29,866 --> 00:05:30,533 refreshed and... 331 00:05:32,333 --> 00:05:33,250 Oh that is a lot 332 00:05:33,250 --> 00:05:33,433 of 333 00:05:33,433 --> 00:05:34,399 polymarket ads. 334 00:05:34,433 --> 00:05:35,066 That's just... 335 00:05:37,100 --> 00:05:37,666 Okay I guess I 336 00:05:37,666 --> 00:05:37,883 should've 337 00:05:37,883 --> 00:05:38,233 patched. 338 00:05:40,166 --> 00:05:40,883 Everyone taking 339 00:05:40,883 --> 00:05:41,566 down their sites 340 00:05:41,566 --> 00:05:42,716 wasn't all bad. 341 00:05:43,250 --> 00:05:44,116 4Chan was down 342 00:05:44,116 --> 00:05:44,716 for a little bit. 343 00:05:48,116 --> 00:05:49,216 Both Google and 344 00:05:49,216 --> 00:05:50,066 OpenAI are 345 00:05:50,066 --> 00:05:50,783 telling people 346 00:05:50,783 --> 00:05:51,616 that their AI 347 00:05:51,616 --> 00:05:52,616 models were used 348 00:05:52,666 --> 00:05:53,983 to find and fix 349 00:05:54,283 --> 00:05:55,399 the recent PHP 350 00:05:55,433 --> 00:05:56,300 vulnerabilities. 351 00:05:56,816 --> 00:05:57,616 Which is probably 352 00:05:57,616 --> 00:05:58,516 true, the issues 353 00:05:58,516 --> 00:05:59,233 were found by 354 00:05:59,233 --> 00:05:59,899 multiple groups 355 00:05:59,899 --> 00:06:00,350 of people. 356 00:06:00,983 --> 00:06:01,516 But it's weird 357 00:06:01,516 --> 00:06:02,066 they both want 358 00:06:02,066 --> 00:06:03,016 credit for such a 359 00:06:03,016 --> 00:06:04,216 bad event, people 360 00:06:04,216 --> 00:06:04,550 working 361 00:06:04,550 --> 00:06:04,916 around the 362 00:06:04,933 --> 00:06:05,716 clock to patch 363 00:06:05,716 --> 00:06:06,533 systems under 364 00:06:06,833 --> 00:06:07,583 tremendous 365 00:06:07,583 --> 00:06:07,933 amounts 366 00:06:07,933 --> 00:06:08,666 of stress. 367 00:06:09,133 --> 00:06:09,683 And if they keep 368 00:06:09,683 --> 00:06:10,583 talking about it, 369 00:06:10,916 --> 00:06:11,566 people won't have 370 00:06:11,566 --> 00:06:12,199 nice things to 371 00:06:12,199 --> 00:06:13,033 say about Google 372 00:06:13,100 --> 00:06:14,266 or OpenAI. 373 00:06:14,899 --> 00:06:15,733 Like when I tell 374 00:06:15,733 --> 00:06:16,483 Linux users I 375 00:06:16,483 --> 00:06:17,083 used to work for 376 00:06:17,083 --> 00:06:17,750 Microsoft. 377 00:06:18,116 --> 00:06:18,716 Conversations 378 00:06:18,716 --> 00:06:18,983 just... 379 00:06:19,633 --> 00:06:20,483 Kinda end after 380 00:06:20,483 --> 00:06:20,750 that for 381 00:06:20,750 --> 00:06:21,166 some reason. 382 00:06:26,000 --> 00:06:26,833 Responsibly 383 00:06:26,833 --> 00:06:27,766 disclosing cyber 384 00:06:27,766 --> 00:06:28,183 security 385 00:06:28,183 --> 00:06:29,033 vulnerabilities 386 00:06:29,066 --> 00:06:29,666 involves a 387 00:06:29,666 --> 00:06:30,533 lot of work. 388 00:06:30,716 --> 00:06:31,783 By a lot 389 00:06:31,783 --> 00:06:32,333 of people. 390 00:06:32,783 --> 00:06:33,266 Everyone 391 00:06:33,266 --> 00:06:33,916 coordinates 392 00:06:33,916 --> 00:06:34,550 together to 393 00:06:34,550 --> 00:06:34,916 ensure 394 00:06:34,916 --> 00:06:36,933 notifications go 395 00:06:36,933 --> 00:06:38,166 out when a patch 396 00:06:38,166 --> 00:06:38,683 is available 397 00:06:38,966 --> 00:06:39,583 in order to 398 00:06:39,583 --> 00:06:40,433 reduce how much 399 00:06:40,433 --> 00:06:41,449 time the bad guys 400 00:06:41,449 --> 00:06:42,550 can attack on 401 00:06:42,550 --> 00:06:43,416 patched systems. 402 00:06:44,133 --> 00:06:44,949 But why work with 403 00:06:44,949 --> 00:06:45,766 people when you 404 00:06:45,766 --> 00:06:46,033 could just 405 00:06:46,033 --> 00:06:46,633 release the patch 406 00:06:46,633 --> 00:06:47,449 on your own and 407 00:06:47,449 --> 00:06:47,816 get all the 408 00:06:47,816 --> 00:06:48,050 credit? 409 00:06:48,683 --> 00:06:49,166 That's what the 410 00:06:49,216 --> 00:06:50,033 container image 411 00:06:50,033 --> 00:06:50,949 security company 412 00:06:50,949 --> 00:06:51,533 ChainGuard 413 00:06:51,533 --> 00:06:52,533 decided to do 414 00:06:52,533 --> 00:06:53,133 when they 415 00:06:53,133 --> 00:06:53,483 published 416 00:06:53,483 --> 00:06:54,466 container images 417 00:06:54,466 --> 00:06:55,183 with patches to 418 00:06:55,183 --> 00:06:56,116 the recent PHP 419 00:06:56,116 --> 00:06:56,966 vulnerabilities. 420 00:06:57,800 --> 00:06:58,483 By deploying a 421 00:06:58,483 --> 00:06:59,216 day early, 422 00:06:59,333 --> 00:07:00,083 attackers were 423 00:07:00,116 --> 00:07:00,983 able to reverse 424 00:07:00,983 --> 00:07:01,466 engineer the 425 00:07:01,466 --> 00:07:02,000 patch to 426 00:07:02,033 --> 00:07:02,516 understand 427 00:07:02,516 --> 00:07:03,316 the vulnerability 428 00:07:03,733 --> 00:07:04,166 and begin 429 00:07:04,166 --> 00:07:05,033 attacking servers 430 00:07:05,033 --> 00:07:05,750 before a patch 431 00:07:05,750 --> 00:07:06,116 was even 432 00:07:06,116 --> 00:07:06,649 available. 433 00:07:07,100 --> 00:07:07,883 This is what many 434 00:07:07,883 --> 00:07:08,666 in the security 435 00:07:08,666 --> 00:07:09,616 industry call a 436 00:07:10,016 --> 00:07:10,766 "dick move". 437 00:07:11,683 --> 00:07:13,133 Now, of course, 438 00:07:13,550 --> 00:07:14,449 publishing early 439 00:07:14,449 --> 00:07:14,933 is an easy 440 00:07:14,933 --> 00:07:15,433 mistake. 441 00:07:15,500 --> 00:07:15,766 People 442 00:07:15,766 --> 00:07:16,366 accidentally 443 00:07:16,366 --> 00:07:16,883 click the wrong 444 00:07:16,883 --> 00:07:18,116 button, enter the 445 00:07:18,116 --> 00:07:18,350 wrong 446 00:07:18,350 --> 00:07:19,033 publish time, 447 00:07:19,033 --> 00:07:19,783 and you know how 448 00:07:19,783 --> 00:07:20,300 hard time 449 00:07:20,300 --> 00:07:21,083 zones can be. 450 00:07:21,649 --> 00:07:21,883 There's a 451 00:07:21,883 --> 00:07:22,433 lot of them. 452 00:07:23,566 --> 00:07:24,233 But ChainGuard's 453 00:07:24,233 --> 00:07:25,566 CEO, Dan Lorenc, 454 00:07:25,766 --> 00:07:26,483 posted on 455 00:07:26,483 --> 00:07:27,866 LinkedIn, saying 456 00:07:27,866 --> 00:07:29,383 this was done on 457 00:07:29,483 --> 00:07:30,050 purpose 458 00:07:30,383 --> 00:07:31,883 and that he made 459 00:07:31,883 --> 00:07:32,483 the go-ahead 460 00:07:32,483 --> 00:07:32,966 decision. 461 00:07:33,833 --> 00:07:34,316 He says the 462 00:07:34,316 --> 00:07:35,183 vulnerability had 463 00:07:35,216 --> 00:07:35,683 already been 464 00:07:35,683 --> 00:07:36,316 discovered by 465 00:07:36,350 --> 00:07:37,516 attackers and 466 00:07:37,516 --> 00:07:38,116 they were seeing 467 00:07:38,116 --> 00:07:38,833 attacks against 468 00:07:38,833 --> 00:07:39,316 production 469 00:07:39,316 --> 00:07:39,866 systems. 470 00:07:40,399 --> 00:07:41,333 But other people 471 00:07:41,333 --> 00:07:42,533 say, "Doesn't 472 00:07:42,533 --> 00:07:43,466 matter, still a 473 00:07:43,466 --> 00:07:44,000 dick move." 474 00:07:45,383 --> 00:07:45,983 It didn't help 475 00:07:45,983 --> 00:07:46,883 ChainGuard's case 476 00:07:46,883 --> 00:07:48,199 when one Reddit 477 00:07:48,233 --> 00:07:49,183 user posted that 478 00:07:49,183 --> 00:07:50,083 their company was 479 00:07:50,116 --> 00:07:50,816 contacted by 480 00:07:50,833 --> 00:07:51,166 ChainGuard 481 00:07:51,199 --> 00:07:52,283 affiliates to 482 00:07:52,283 --> 00:07:53,033 provide paid 483 00:07:53,033 --> 00:07:53,449 security 484 00:07:53,449 --> 00:07:54,116 services, 485 00:07:54,683 --> 00:07:55,616 making it seem 486 00:07:55,616 --> 00:07:56,233 like ChainGuard 487 00:07:56,333 --> 00:07:58,033 was trying to 488 00:07:58,033 --> 00:07:58,699 take advantage of 489 00:07:58,699 --> 00:07:59,566 the situation to 490 00:07:59,566 --> 00:07:59,833 get their 491 00:07:59,833 --> 00:08:00,649 name out there. 492 00:08:01,216 --> 00:08:01,783 I don't know if 493 00:08:01,783 --> 00:08:02,516 that was actually 494 00:08:02,516 --> 00:08:03,316 the plan, but it 495 00:08:03,316 --> 00:08:04,100 feels like a... 496 00:08:04,516 --> 00:08:05,083 Um... 497 00:08:06,166 --> 00:08:06,649 God, it's on the 498 00:08:06,649 --> 00:08:07,399 tip of my tongue. 499 00:08:07,433 --> 00:08:07,883 Um... 500 00:08:08,183 --> 00:08:09,583 Oh! A dick move. 501 00:08:13,516 --> 00:08:14,333 Hey, speaking of 502 00:08:14,333 --> 00:08:15,166 dick moves, did 503 00:08:15,166 --> 00:08:15,883 you know 504 00:08:15,883 --> 00:08:16,616 globalglob.dev 505 00:08:16,616 --> 00:08:17,366 has a newsletter? 506 00:08:17,683 --> 00:08:18,883 It gets news sent 507 00:08:18,916 --> 00:08:19,850 directly to your 508 00:08:19,883 --> 00:08:20,933 inbox, once a 509 00:08:20,933 --> 00:08:22,133 week, every week, 510 00:08:22,399 --> 00:08:22,966 for free. 511 00:08:23,600 --> 00:08:24,133 Just remember to 512 00:08:24,133 --> 00:08:24,466 check your 513 00:08:24,466 --> 00:08:25,133 spam folder. 514 00:08:25,733 --> 00:08:26,333 You can sign up 515 00:08:26,333 --> 00:08:26,833 today at 516 00:08:26,833 --> 00:08:27,949 globalglob.dev 517 00:08:28,033 --> 00:08:29,233 slash newsletter. 518 00:08:32,233 --> 00:08:32,983 The certificate 519 00:08:33,016 --> 00:08:33,649 authority, 520 00:08:33,833 --> 00:08:35,333 eMudhra, had some 521 00:08:35,366 --> 00:08:36,350 incredibly 522 00:08:36,383 --> 00:08:36,883 insecure 523 00:08:36,883 --> 00:08:37,783 certificates, 524 00:08:38,116 --> 00:08:38,383 and that 525 00:08:38,383 --> 00:08:39,049 just sucks. 526 00:08:40,066 --> 00:08:41,083 Normally, a lot 527 00:08:41,083 --> 00:08:42,283 of bits are used 528 00:08:42,283 --> 00:08:42,916 to generate a 529 00:08:42,916 --> 00:08:43,549 certificate's 530 00:08:43,549 --> 00:08:44,683 private key, like 531 00:08:44,683 --> 00:08:46,283 384 of them. 532 00:08:46,966 --> 00:08:47,533 This means the 533 00:08:47,566 --> 00:08:48,799 actual key is a 534 00:08:48,799 --> 00:08:49,733 large number, 535 00:08:49,783 --> 00:08:50,566 something like 536 00:08:50,566 --> 00:08:53,133 116 digits long. 537 00:08:54,316 --> 00:08:55,366 It's a very large 538 00:08:55,366 --> 00:08:56,366 number you aren't 539 00:08:56,383 --> 00:08:57,116 brute-forcing. 540 00:08:57,983 --> 00:08:58,433 Probably not 541 00:08:58,433 --> 00:08:59,333 guessing either, 542 00:08:59,483 --> 00:08:59,983 unless you're 543 00:09:00,116 --> 00:09:00,766 really lucky. 544 00:09:01,583 --> 00:09:01,883 That would be 545 00:09:01,916 --> 00:09:02,383 cool to see. 546 00:09:03,416 --> 00:09:04,316 Anyway, in the 547 00:09:04,316 --> 00:09:05,000 case of the 548 00:09:05,000 --> 00:09:05,283 eMudhra 549 00:09:05,299 --> 00:09:06,133 certificates, 550 00:09:06,316 --> 00:09:07,316 they only used a 551 00:09:07,316 --> 00:09:08,600 single byte, 552 00:09:08,916 --> 00:09:10,033 8 bits for those 553 00:09:10,033 --> 00:09:10,366 of you on the 554 00:09:10,366 --> 00:09:11,000 metric system. 555 00:09:11,983 --> 00:09:12,833 Which means, at 556 00:09:12,833 --> 00:09:14,233 most, the private 557 00:09:14,233 --> 00:09:15,016 key was the 558 00:09:15,016 --> 00:09:16,083 number 255. 559 00:09:16,966 --> 00:09:18,049 Something you can 560 00:09:18,049 --> 00:09:18,833 brute force. 561 00:09:19,633 --> 00:09:20,149 Still probably 562 00:09:20,149 --> 00:09:20,633 aren't guessing. 563 00:09:21,883 --> 00:09:23,033 Using such a low 564 00:09:23,066 --> 00:09:24,083 amount of bits, 565 00:09:24,200 --> 00:09:24,566 one of the 566 00:09:24,566 --> 00:09:24,916 private 567 00:09:24,916 --> 00:09:26,033 keys was four. 568 00:09:26,566 --> 00:09:27,316 The algorithm 569 00:09:27,316 --> 00:09:28,216 randomly chose 570 00:09:28,216 --> 00:09:29,183 the number four. 571 00:09:29,633 --> 00:09:30,116 A number a 572 00:09:30,116 --> 00:09:30,616 toddler 573 00:09:30,616 --> 00:09:31,250 would guess. 574 00:09:32,533 --> 00:09:33,133 Browsers have 575 00:09:33,166 --> 00:09:33,799 already been 576 00:09:33,833 --> 00:09:34,700 updated to block 577 00:09:34,700 --> 00:09:35,450 the insecure 578 00:09:35,450 --> 00:09:35,966 intermediate 579 00:09:35,966 --> 00:09:36,733 certificates, 580 00:09:37,399 --> 00:09:37,916 but that just 581 00:09:37,916 --> 00:09:38,633 means users will 582 00:09:38,633 --> 00:09:39,233 see a browser 583 00:09:39,233 --> 00:09:40,066 warning saying 584 00:09:40,066 --> 00:09:40,616 their connection 585 00:09:40,616 --> 00:09:41,233 isn't secure. 586 00:09:42,233 --> 00:09:43,166 And no one cares. 587 00:09:43,166 --> 00:09:43,783 Google already 588 00:09:43,783 --> 00:09:44,416 sees everything 589 00:09:44,416 --> 00:09:45,233 else I do on the 590 00:09:45,233 --> 00:09:45,833 internet just to 591 00:09:45,833 --> 00:09:46,666 sell ads. 592 00:09:46,916 --> 00:09:47,416 What makes this 593 00:09:47,416 --> 00:09:47,933 any different? 594 00:09:49,216 --> 00:09:49,733 Certificate 595 00:09:49,733 --> 00:09:50,683 generation is a 596 00:09:50,683 --> 00:09:51,566 small part of 597 00:09:51,600 --> 00:09:52,066 eMudhra's 598 00:09:52,066 --> 00:09:52,583 business, 599 00:09:52,916 --> 00:09:53,450 and after these 600 00:09:53,450 --> 00:09:54,200 events, they have 601 00:09:54,200 --> 00:09:55,033 decided to leave 602 00:09:55,033 --> 00:09:55,733 the certificate 603 00:09:55,733 --> 00:09:56,149 business 604 00:09:56,183 --> 00:09:56,833 altogether. 605 00:09:57,566 --> 00:09:58,316 They didn't say 606 00:09:58,316 --> 00:09:59,083 when they will 607 00:09:59,116 --> 00:09:59,483 exit the 608 00:09:59,483 --> 00:10:00,016 business, 609 00:10:00,433 --> 00:10:00,833 but if they 610 00:10:00,833 --> 00:10:01,633 randomly choose a 611 00:10:01,633 --> 00:10:02,333 number, I'm 612 00:10:02,333 --> 00:10:03,616 betting two days. 613 00:10:05,366 --> 00:10:05,816 Should have used 614 00:10:05,816 --> 00:10:06,350 more bytes again. 615 00:10:14,266 --> 00:10:18,033 A vulnerability 616 00:10:18,033 --> 00:10:19,116 was announced in 617 00:10:19,116 --> 00:10:20,383 Node.js when it 618 00:10:20,383 --> 00:10:21,083 decompresses 619 00:10:21,083 --> 00:10:21,616 content 620 00:10:21,866 --> 00:10:22,750 that used the 621 00:10:22,750 --> 00:10:23,216 brotli 622 00:10:23,216 --> 00:10:23,616 compression 623 00:10:23,616 --> 00:10:24,216 algorithm. 624 00:10:24,866 --> 00:10:25,083 This 625 00:10:25,083 --> 00:10:26,083 vulnerability was 626 00:10:26,083 --> 00:10:26,450 dubbed 627 00:10:26,450 --> 00:10:27,383 Node2Shell. 628 00:10:28,016 --> 00:10:28,533 But don't worry 629 00:10:28,533 --> 00:10:29,066 if you've already 630 00:10:29,066 --> 00:10:29,350 forgotten 631 00:10:29,350 --> 00:10:29,733 the name. 632 00:10:30,016 --> 00:10:30,566 I know I have. 633 00:10:31,250 --> 00:10:31,883 Because it turns 634 00:10:31,883 --> 00:10:32,533 out other 635 00:10:32,533 --> 00:10:33,350 frameworks had 636 00:10:33,350 --> 00:10:34,366 the exact same 637 00:10:34,366 --> 00:10:35,083 vulnerability. 638 00:10:35,533 --> 00:10:36,016 So it was 639 00:10:36,016 --> 00:10:38,766 rebranded HTTP2Shell 640 00:10:39,383 --> 00:10:40,066 Python, C++, 641 00:10:40,616 --> 00:10:42,049 Node.js, and Bun 642 00:10:42,083 --> 00:10:43,066 are all affected 643 00:10:43,333 --> 00:10:44,000 by the same 644 00:10:44,000 --> 00:10:44,750 vulnerability. 645 00:10:45,433 --> 00:10:45,866 But whatever 646 00:10:45,866 --> 00:10:46,616 you're using, 647 00:10:47,266 --> 00:10:48,016 just patch. 648 00:10:48,433 --> 00:10:49,333 Add every patch 649 00:10:49,366 --> 00:10:49,766 you get. 650 00:10:49,783 --> 00:10:50,833 Add so many 651 00:10:50,833 --> 00:10:51,500 patches. 652 00:10:52,216 --> 00:10:54,133 Just use every 653 00:10:54,133 --> 00:10:54,799 patch that your 654 00:10:54,799 --> 00:10:55,466 code is just 655 00:10:55,466 --> 00:10:56,516 patched patches. 656 00:10:56,533 --> 00:10:57,116 You know what 657 00:10:57,916 --> 00:10:59,116 isn't affected by 658 00:10:59,183 --> 00:11:00,016 HTTP2Shell? 659 00:11:00,533 --> 00:11:01,216 C#. 660 00:11:01,783 --> 00:11:03,316 Well, okay, that 661 00:11:03,316 --> 00:11:04,399 was true when 662 00:11:04,399 --> 00:11:05,033 this script was 663 00:11:05,033 --> 00:11:05,416 originally 664 00:11:05,416 --> 00:11:05,750 written. 665 00:11:06,049 --> 00:11:06,983 But even that is 666 00:11:06,983 --> 00:11:07,516 affected by 667 00:11:07,516 --> 00:11:08,066 this issue. 668 00:11:08,416 --> 00:11:09,049 And Microsoft 669 00:11:09,049 --> 00:11:09,466 released an 670 00:11:09,500 --> 00:11:10,433 out-of-band patch 671 00:11:10,733 --> 00:11:12,799 on a Sunday 672 00:11:12,799 --> 00:11:13,583 to fix it. 673 00:11:14,100 --> 00:11:14,583 Welcome to 674 00:11:14,583 --> 00:11:14,966 the future. 675 00:11:15,316 --> 00:11:15,816 Everything is 676 00:11:15,816 --> 00:11:16,616 broken and the 677 00:11:16,616 --> 00:11:17,733 patching barely 678 00:11:17,733 --> 00:11:18,166 matters. 679 00:11:19,183 --> 00:11:19,783 The best part of 680 00:11:19,783 --> 00:11:20,416 this whole saga 681 00:11:20,416 --> 00:11:21,666 is that this 682 00:11:21,666 --> 00:11:22,283 vulnerability 683 00:11:22,283 --> 00:11:23,283 was found, 684 00:11:23,500 --> 00:11:24,316 reported, and 685 00:11:24,316 --> 00:11:25,416 fixed this past 686 00:11:25,416 --> 00:11:25,933 February. 687 00:11:26,483 --> 00:11:27,016 But for some 688 00:11:27,016 --> 00:11:27,833 reason, Google 689 00:11:27,833 --> 00:11:28,733 didn't label it a 690 00:11:28,733 --> 00:11:29,149 security 691 00:11:29,149 --> 00:11:29,866 vulnerability, 692 00:11:30,283 --> 00:11:31,316 so no one shipped 693 00:11:31,316 --> 00:11:32,366 the fix until 694 00:11:32,366 --> 00:11:33,133 this week. 695 00:11:33,583 --> 00:11:34,250 But don't worry, 696 00:11:34,816 --> 00:11:35,833 it was mislabeled 697 00:11:35,866 --> 00:11:36,866 by a human. 698 00:11:37,366 --> 00:11:38,149 Google Gemini 699 00:11:38,183 --> 00:11:38,516 would have 700 00:11:38,516 --> 00:11:38,933 labeled it 701 00:11:38,933 --> 00:11:39,466 correctly, 702 00:11:39,583 --> 00:11:40,066 probably, 703 00:11:40,133 --> 00:11:40,733 we assume. 704 00:11:41,416 --> 00:11:41,716 Don't think 705 00:11:42,133 --> 00:11:42,766 Gemini is at 706 00:11:42,766 --> 00:11:43,216 fault here. 707 00:11:43,933 --> 00:11:44,966 The supreme AI 708 00:11:44,983 --> 00:11:45,649 would have done 709 00:11:45,649 --> 00:11:46,333 the right thing. 710 00:11:48,483 --> 00:11:49,316 Brotli has become 711 00:11:49,316 --> 00:11:50,149 the de facto 712 00:11:50,149 --> 00:11:50,899 standard of web 713 00:11:50,899 --> 00:11:51,433 compression, 714 00:11:51,683 --> 00:11:52,549 which is weird 715 00:11:52,549 --> 00:11:53,000 because when I 716 00:11:53,000 --> 00:11:53,866 hear brotli, I 717 00:11:53,866 --> 00:11:54,516 think of broccoli, 718 00:11:55,250 --> 00:11:56,083 that's gross. 719 00:11:57,233 --> 00:11:58,166 Because it's the 720 00:11:58,166 --> 00:11:58,549 default 721 00:11:58,549 --> 00:11:59,033 compression 722 00:11:59,033 --> 00:11:59,533 choice, 723 00:11:59,600 --> 00:12:00,500 this bug affects 724 00:12:00,533 --> 00:12:01,316 anyone who wants 725 00:12:01,316 --> 00:12:02,333 to save bits on 726 00:12:02,333 --> 00:12:02,816 the internet. 727 00:12:03,233 --> 00:12:03,950 Like how right 728 00:12:03,950 --> 00:12:04,766 now you're 729 00:12:04,766 --> 00:12:06,116 choosing to watch 730 00:12:06,116 --> 00:12:06,983 this video in 731 00:12:06,983 --> 00:12:08,433 compressed 240p, 732 00:12:08,866 --> 00:12:09,583 so you don't have 733 00:12:09,583 --> 00:12:10,133 to look at a 734 00:12:10,183 --> 00:12:10,783 crystal clear 735 00:12:10,783 --> 00:12:11,233 picture 736 00:12:11,416 --> 00:12:12,283 of my face. 737 00:12:16,933 --> 00:12:18,016 Developers in the 738 00:12:18,016 --> 00:12:18,883 gaming industry 739 00:12:18,883 --> 00:12:19,883 continue to get 740 00:12:19,883 --> 00:12:20,633 screwed over 741 00:12:20,866 --> 00:12:21,799 because the video 742 00:12:21,799 --> 00:12:23,066 game giant EA 743 00:12:23,366 --> 00:12:23,983 will be cutting 744 00:12:23,983 --> 00:12:25,399 400 jobs. 745 00:12:26,116 --> 00:12:26,816 They will also 746 00:12:26,816 --> 00:12:27,433 shut down the 747 00:12:27,433 --> 00:12:28,183 game studio 748 00:12:28,183 --> 00:12:29,333 Bioware, who made 749 00:12:29,366 --> 00:12:30,266 Dragon Age and 750 00:12:30,266 --> 00:12:31,033 Mass Effect. 751 00:12:31,583 --> 00:12:32,149 Presumably 752 00:12:32,149 --> 00:12:32,666 because 753 00:12:32,716 --> 00:12:33,266 award-winning 754 00:12:33,266 --> 00:12:34,216 games don't make 755 00:12:34,216 --> 00:12:34,816 enough money. 756 00:12:35,416 --> 00:12:35,683 They're too 757 00:12:35,683 --> 00:12:36,266 expensive to 758 00:12:36,266 --> 00:12:36,950 make, and you 759 00:12:36,950 --> 00:12:37,850 can't make a new 760 00:12:37,850 --> 00:12:38,783 one every year. 761 00:12:39,166 --> 00:12:39,716 Like all of the 762 00:12:39,716 --> 00:12:40,850 sports games EA 763 00:12:40,850 --> 00:12:41,566 announced, they 764 00:12:41,566 --> 00:12:42,566 will continue to 765 00:12:42,566 --> 00:12:43,016 develop. 766 00:12:43,633 --> 00:12:44,183 It's much more 767 00:12:44,183 --> 00:12:45,049 lucrative to make 768 00:12:45,049 --> 00:12:45,883 the same game 769 00:12:45,983 --> 00:12:46,966 every year with 770 00:12:47,000 --> 00:12:47,416 updated 771 00:12:47,416 --> 00:12:48,350 player stats. 772 00:12:48,950 --> 00:12:49,483 I don't play 773 00:12:49,483 --> 00:12:50,083 sports games 774 00:12:50,083 --> 00:12:51,016 anymore, but I 775 00:12:51,016 --> 00:12:51,649 assume they have 776 00:12:51,649 --> 00:12:52,549 built-in stores 777 00:12:52,549 --> 00:12:52,933 like every 778 00:12:52,933 --> 00:12:53,450 other game. 779 00:12:53,899 --> 00:12:54,733 If I played NBA 780 00:12:54,733 --> 00:12:56,083 2K, I'd better be 781 00:12:56,083 --> 00:12:57,016 able to buy skins 782 00:12:57,016 --> 00:12:57,416 to make the 783 00:12:57,416 --> 00:12:58,316 Atlanta Hawks 784 00:12:58,516 --> 00:12:59,366 look like actual 785 00:12:59,366 --> 00:13:00,766 Hawks, and I want 786 00:13:00,766 --> 00:13:01,516 the basketball to 787 00:13:01,516 --> 00:13:01,966 look like a 788 00:13:01,966 --> 00:13:03,016 giant walnut, 789 00:13:03,616 --> 00:13:04,066 because I don't 790 00:13:04,066 --> 00:13:04,666 know what Hawks 791 00:13:04,666 --> 00:13:05,383 eat, and it might 792 00:13:05,383 --> 00:13:05,899 be a walnut. 793 00:13:07,016 --> 00:13:07,633 Of course, you 794 00:13:07,666 --> 00:13:08,149 need special 795 00:13:08,149 --> 00:13:08,983 animations like 796 00:13:08,983 --> 00:13:09,533 confetti, 797 00:13:09,566 --> 00:13:10,250 fireworks, 798 00:13:10,250 --> 00:13:10,916 and aliens 799 00:13:10,916 --> 00:13:11,416 abducting the 800 00:13:11,416 --> 00:13:11,983 audience when I 801 00:13:11,983 --> 00:13:13,033 do a sick slam 802 00:13:13,033 --> 00:13:14,366 dunk, and I'm 803 00:13:14,366 --> 00:13:14,899 willing to pay 804 00:13:14,899 --> 00:13:16,333 $300 to do that. 805 00:13:17,899 --> 00:13:18,716 No, seriously, I 806 00:13:18,716 --> 00:13:19,183 haven't played 807 00:13:19,183 --> 00:13:19,616 these sports 808 00:13:19,616 --> 00:13:19,916 games in a 809 00:13:19,916 --> 00:13:20,450 long time. 810 00:13:20,483 --> 00:13:21,383 I genuinely think 811 00:13:21,383 --> 00:13:21,733 you can do 812 00:13:21,733 --> 00:13:22,083 this now. 813 00:13:26,183 --> 00:13:26,899 Amazon has 814 00:13:26,899 --> 00:13:27,583 announced that 815 00:13:27,583 --> 00:13:28,549 they've sold out 816 00:13:28,549 --> 00:13:29,516 of their AWS 817 00:13:29,516 --> 00:13:30,466 cloud capacity 818 00:13:30,500 --> 00:13:31,483 through 2027, 819 00:13:32,183 --> 00:13:32,833 so if you need 820 00:13:32,833 --> 00:13:34,183 more compute, try 821 00:13:34,183 --> 00:13:34,816 to find an old 822 00:13:34,816 --> 00:13:35,516 laptop in the 823 00:13:35,516 --> 00:13:36,083 city dump. 824 00:13:36,716 --> 00:13:37,133 You're probably 825 00:13:37,133 --> 00:13:37,916 competing with 826 00:13:37,933 --> 00:13:38,833 dumpster divers 827 00:13:38,833 --> 00:13:39,983 hired by Amazon, 828 00:13:39,983 --> 00:13:40,933 but maybe you'll 829 00:13:40,933 --> 00:13:41,383 get lucky. 830 00:13:42,316 --> 00:13:43,100 The cloud giant 831 00:13:43,100 --> 00:13:44,783 said 2027 is sold 832 00:13:44,783 --> 00:13:45,500 out except for a 833 00:13:45,500 --> 00:13:46,100 small 834 00:13:46,100 --> 00:13:47,033 amount of compute 835 00:13:47,033 --> 00:13:47,600 they're saving 836 00:13:47,600 --> 00:13:48,266 for on-demand 837 00:13:48,266 --> 00:13:49,466 workloads, and if 838 00:13:49,466 --> 00:13:51,049 you're nice, they 839 00:13:51,049 --> 00:13:51,716 might sell 840 00:13:51,716 --> 00:13:52,066 it to you. 841 00:13:52,083 --> 00:13:54,733 [END PLAYBACK] 842 00:13:55,283 --> 00:13:55,766 And that's all 843 00:13:55,766 --> 00:13:56,299 the news we 844 00:13:56,299 --> 00:13:57,316 logged this week. 845 00:13:57,533 --> 00:13:58,100 If you enjoyed 846 00:13:58,100 --> 00:13:58,766 the show, tell 847 00:13:58,766 --> 00:13:59,566 your loved ones. 848 00:13:59,633 --> 00:13:59,983 And if you 849 00:13:59,983 --> 00:14:01,100 didn't, tell your 850 00:14:01,100 --> 00:14:02,000 AI agents. 851 00:14:02,516 --> 00:14:03,133 For more news 852 00:14:03,133 --> 00:14:03,733 before the next 853 00:14:03,733 --> 00:14:04,549 episode, remember 854 00:14:04,549 --> 00:14:05,083 to visit 855 00:14:05,083 --> 00:14:06,433 globalglob.dev 856 00:14:06,799 --> 00:14:07,183 for news 857 00:14:07,183 --> 00:14:07,666 technology 858 00:14:07,666 --> 00:14:08,366 professionals 859 00:14:08,383 --> 00:14:08,666 really 860 00:14:08,666 --> 00:14:09,200 care about. 861 00:14:09,883 --> 00:14:10,333 And if you're the 862 00:14:10,333 --> 00:14:11,216 forgetful type, 863 00:14:11,266 --> 00:14:12,049 sign up for the 864 00:14:12,049 --> 00:14:12,983 weekly newsletter 865 00:14:13,283 --> 00:14:13,399 at 866 00:14:13,416 --> 00:14:14,450 globalglob.dev. 867 00:14:15,016 --> 00:14:16,733 It includes more 868 00:14:16,733 --> 00:14:17,483 tech news we 869 00:14:17,483 --> 00:14:18,383 couldn't fit in 870 00:14:18,383 --> 00:14:19,016 this show. 871 00:14:19,733 --> 00:14:20,633 Until next time, 872 00:14:20,683 --> 00:14:21,166 go twiddle 873 00:14:21,166 --> 00:14:21,799 some bits. 874 00:14:22,783 --> 00:14:25,766 [MUSIC PLAYING]